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The Mathew 0. Tobriner Memorial Lecture
Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political





Forty-three years have passed since the proclamation of the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights and thirty years since the founding of
Amnesty International. Fifteen years ago, President Carter announced
that human rights would be one of the cornerstones of his administra-
tion's foreign policy. Only yesterday, most of Latin America was under
military rule. As we gather here today, the effects of the political events
that led to the thunderous tumbling of the Berlin Wall continue to be
played out dramatically.
These milestones are of dissimilar character and consequence. Nev-
ertheless, each marks a new phase in the steady progression of the human
rights cause. Although its roots are ancient, the human rights cause en-
tered the international arena only after the Second World War. Initially,
human rights concerns were confined to the United Nations and other
intergovernmental forums. During the 1960s, human rights began to be
* This lecture was presented at Hastings College of the Law on October 15, 1991. The
Mathew 0. Tobriner Memorial Lecture, in honor of Justice Mathew Tobriner of the Supreme
Court of California, was established by close friends and relatives of the Justice to serve as a
permanent memorial to him and his life's work. Justice Tobriner said: "In the context of law,
the underlying moral value of our American society, I think, is the protection of the individual
citizen for the purpose, and in hope, that he may reach his greatest fulfillment and self-
realization as a person."
** Chairperson, International Human Rights Internship Program; Fellow, MacArthur
Foundation, 1990-1995; Member, International Commission of Jurists. J.D. 1967, summa
cum laude, University of Chile. The author wishes to express his sincere thanks to the
Mathew 0. Tobriner Memorial Committee for inviting him to deliver this lecture, part of a
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a rallying point for international activism by ordinary people on behalf of
persecuted people elsewhere in the world. Starting in the 1970s, human
rights became a recurring agenda item in superpower summits as well as
in other relations between states. In recent years, human rights norms
have come to be accepted as beyond dispute, across borderlines and polit-
ical or religious divisions. Human rights are now strongly associated
with democracy and are widely recognized as the preeminent issue of
political ethics.
Progress has occurred. Perhaps it can be said that a whole chapter
has been completed in the history of human rights as an international
cause. But there is no room for complacency. Human rights violations,
though abated in many places, persist in others. We are thus reminded
that the fact that human rights norms have become indisputable is not a
guarantee that transgressions will cease. The very political changes that
have contributed to strengthening the human rights cause have also
brought about novel ethical and political challenges. We are thus re-
minded that solutions often pose new problems.
Two new problems have emerged in the field of human rights in
recent years. The first relates to the protection of human rights in vari-
ous situations of armed conflict and political violence. Ten or twelve
years ago, the typical transgression confronted by human rights activists
was the arbitrary attack of dictatorial governments upon the rights of
peaceful opponents. Now, most atrocities are caused by governmental
and non-governmental armed groups in the context, or under the pretext,
of conventional warfare; armed resistance against occupation; civil war,
insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns; and separatist, religious
and other such interethnic or intercommunal violence. In this context, it
is necessary to promote basic principles to hold all political actors-gov-
ernment and opposition groups-accountable.
The second significant problem in the human rights field is how
emerging democracies ought to address the atrocities of their recent past
when the perpetrators still wield considerable political or military power.
This problem has become evident and urgent only in recent years. Start-
ing in the 1960s, nongovernmental human rights organizations, which
form the backbone of the human rights movement, grew and spread in-
ternationally to many countries where there was a pattern of political
repression. For nearly twenty years these organizations, most notably
Amnesty International, dealt with human rights violations committed by
governments. It was within the power of these governments to continue
or stop such practices. Thus, they could not argue that it was beyond
their authority to comply with demands for the immediate cessation of
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human rights violations. However, demanding that successor govern-
ments fulfill the positive obligation of dispensing justice for past crimes is
altogether different from requiring that they discharge the negative obli-
gation of refraining from committing crimes.
From 1974 to the early eighties, Amnesty International and other
human rights organizations had to deal with governmental policies re-
garding alleged crimes by deposed regimes in countries such as Greece,
after the downfall of the military rulers in 1974; Vietnam, following the
Hanoi regime's victory; and Nicaragua, after the Somoza government
was overthrown in 1979 and the Sandinistas brought thousands of al-
leged agents and supporters of the fallen dictator to trial. In all three
cases the new governments had the power to mete out punishment. The
rulers in Vietnam and Nicaragua had won decisive military victories. In
Greece, the military had just been defeated by Turkey in Cyprus, and its
demoralization prevented it from achieving the cohesion necessary to op-
pose the trial of some of its leaders. Human rights watchdogs were con-
cerned about unfair trials and other, possibly arbitrary actions being
taken by these governments in the name of justice.
After subsequent political changes in the 1980s, an array of difficult
ethical, legal, and political issues relating to the transition from dictator-
ship to democracy became fully apparent. Elected governments replaced
dictatorial regimes in countries notorious for human rights abuses such
as Argentina, Uruguay, and the Philippines. Following this came the
precipitous process of political liberalization that we have witnessed in
recent years in Eastern Europe and many other regions of the world.
Human rights organizations began to focus not only on the possibility of
unfair trials and arbitrary punishments for past human rights violations,
but also on the real probability of impunity.
The foremost test-case in the early and mid-eighties was Argentina.
The Alfonsin government, which came to power in 1983, brought leaders
of the previous military juntas to trial. It also published a report entitled
"Nunca Mas" ("Never Again"), prepared by a presidential panel ap-
pointed to investigate thousands of political "disappearances" during the
period of military rule. Just as in Greece seven years earlier, the Argen-
tine armed forces had been humiliated by a foreign power outside the
mainland. This situation helped bring the main Argentine leaders to jus-
tice. Yet, as the military regained cohesion and determination, it became
much more difficult to dispense justice for past human rights violations.
Intense military pressure forced the Alfonsin government to adopt meas-
ures of leniency. This undermined its initial stand, strongly grounded on
ethical convictions, and diminished the authority of its administration.
Although President Alfonsin undoubtedly acted with the best of inten-
tions and actually realized some notable achievements, the final outcome
of his government's policy suggests that he staked out a position he could
not sustain.
The view of most human rights organizations and international ob-
servers at the time of the events in Argentina was influenced by the ethi-
cal and legal legacy of the paramount war crime cases of our time: the
Niiremberg and Tokyo trials, and the policies adopted by several Euro-
pean countries regarding war criminals. These cases emphasized the
duty to prosecute and punish those guilty of certain crimes so as to pre-
serve the collective memory and build up an effective deterrent. This
policy, which is mandated by human conscience and several interna-
tional legal norms, has guided the prosecution of war criminals for de-
cades. As a consequence, the lessons of World War II have been further
engraved in the conscience of international public opinion.
As human rights organizations followed the events in Argentina,
they applauded the prosecutions and deplored the subsequent leniency.
These reactions may have been justified, but they stemmed from a post-
World War II model for prosecuting war criminals that is not fully ade-
quate to deal with perpetrators who still wield considerable power.
The war criminals brought to justice after the Second World War
had lost both political power and their weapons. Their defeat was abso-
lute and the victors did not have to wrestle with the question of whether
punishing war criminals would provoke an armed reaction. Instead, the
victors were guided by their own sense of justice and by considerations of
the long-term effect of their policies.
In contrast to the situation after World War II, the perpetrators of
past atrocities in Argentina had not lost their monopoly on weapons
within the country. Their military humiliation was the main factor that
debilitated them and thus permitted some measure of punishment. How-
ever, the limits on the government's ability to punish members of the
military soon became apparent.
In other countries, political constraints were even more severe. For
example, the government may have had the legitimacy of a democratic
election, but the military remained a cohesive force with control over the
weapons. Alternatively, past rulers or the party they represented may
have still enjoyed a significant measure of political support among sectors
of the population. Finally, a change of government may have taken place
in the context of a negotiated peace or truce after a bitter civil war with
atrocities on both sides and no clear victor.
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These scenarios represent political transitions that took place at the
time of, or shortly after, the Argentinean trials. In Brazil, Uruguay,
Guatemala and the Philippines; in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia;
and, more recently, in Chile, Nicaragua and El Salvador, the perpetra-
tors of past crimes still wielded considerable political or military power
or were inextricably meshed with the fabric of state institutions.
As a result of these political changes, the implications of the dilem-
mas involved in transitional political situations have become fully appar-
ent. To highlight this point further, consider a plausible hypothetical
case involving South Africa. What would happen if Nelson Mandela
were to gain political power following a negotiated agreement that per-
mitted whites to retain important quotas of military and police control
and a measure of political veto? Would the international community de-
mand that Mandela's government prosecute all of those in authority who
had engaged in apartheid? Would it do so regardless of Mandela's actual
power to comply, and unmindful of the foreseeable or unforeseeable con-
sequences of such a move on the peace and stability of the nation? Prob-
ably not. Such a hypothetical government's policies would likely
emphasize disclosing the full truth about apartheid, preserving the collec-
tive memory of the odious past, seeking compensation for the victims of
the greatest abuses, and perhaps investigating some particularly heinous
crimes.
In ambiguous transitional situations, dealing with past human rights
violations is indeed a wrenching ethical and political problem. But there
are no hard and fast rules on how to proceed. Ethical principles provide
guidance but no definite answer. Political leaders cannot afford to be
moved only by their convictions, oblivious to real-life constraints, lest in
the end the very ethical principles they wish to uphold suffer because of a
political or military backlash. In the face of a disaster brought about by
their own misguided actions, politicians cannot invoke as a justification
that they never yielded on matters of conviction. That would be as
haughty as it would be futile, and certainly would bring no comfort to
the people who must live with the consequences of the politician's
actions.
A variation of that position is often put forward by ideological pur-
ists of all stripes: it is preferable to suffer longer under tyranny, in the
hope of a fully satisfactory political outcome, than to make progress
through untidy compromises. Implicit in this position is the arrogant
expectation that the future will comply with one's wishes and a disdain
for the dreadful costs of such a cavalier gamble. However, it must also
be firmly stated that a politician cannot invoke the need for prudence in
an attempt to justify mere temporization and neglect. The ghosts of the
past, if not exorcised to the fullest extent possible, will continue to haunt
the nation tomorrow. Political leaders should try to do their best. Yet if
it becomes clear that a politician's rule has little practical effect other
than providing a mere veneer of legitimacy for the continued rule and
continuing abuses by the old forces, quitting power may better serve the
principles being pursued.
The approach of democratic leaders in such difficult transitional sit-
uations should, then, be based on the ethical maxim that Max Weber
lucidly characterized in his famous lecture, Politics as a Vocation: Polit-
ical leaders should be guided by the ethics of responsibility, as opposed to
the ethics of conviction.' Weber explained that an ethic of responsibility
does not imply a lack of conviction, just as an ethic of conviction does
not imply a lack of responsibility. He stressed the fundamental difference
between acting according to an ethical precept regardless of the outcome,
and acting while considering the predictable consequences of one's ac-
tion.2 In Weber's view, politicians must always be guided by an ethic of
responsibility. 3 This is especially true where the stakes for society are as
great as the stakes involved in the types of situations we have been
pondering.
Let us examine, then, the two considerations that must be bal-
anced-the ethical principles that ought to be pursued, and actual polit-
ical opportunities and constraints that ought to be taken into account.
By balancing these factors, ethical principles can be realized to the fullest
possible extent.
No single international convention or set of norms exists where such
principles can be found. These principles must be fashioned from ex-
isting international norms, from ethical postulates, and from judgment,
taking into account all relevant experiences.
I submit that these principles should be the following:
a) A policy to deal with past human rights abuses should have two
overall objectives: Preventing the recurrence of such abuses and, to the
extent possible, repairing the damage they have caused.
b) For a policy to be legitimate it must, first, be adopted with full
cognizance of past human rights violations. Second, it must be adopted
1. Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY
77, 120 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946). This latter one, "gesinnung-
sethisch," has also been translated into English as "the ethics of ultimate ends." Id.
2. Id. at 120-22.
3. Id. at 127.
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through a body of democratically elected representatives or by other
means clearly reflecting the sovereign will of the nation.
c) Within the terms just stated, nations have ample discretion con-
cerning the content of the policy. They may lean towards severity or
clemency. But international law limits such sovereign discretion. The
treatment of alleged perpetrators, including their prosecution and pun-
ishment, must not violate the perpetrators' rights. Measures of govern-
mental magnanimity are also limited by international law inasmuch as it
imposes the duty to prosecute those who have committed certain crimes.
The examples I have mentioned thus far illustrate several typical
situations involving a balance of political opportunities and constraints
that will allow us to put these principles into practice. At one extreme, if
the perpetrators have been completely defeated, the new government has
the greatest latitude of action. But past experience suggests that unfet-
tered power to mete out punishment is itself a factor that may place jus-
tice at risk. At the other extreme, if the perpetrators are a cohesive and
determined force enjoying a monopoly on military strength, the obstacles
to justice are most severe. Yet political situations are far from static, and
if the new government consistently follows the best possible approach,
despite being limited by the circumstances it faces, new possibilities may
open up along the way.
Many other factors combine in real life to make each situation
unique. The following are some examples:
(a) Those who committed the human rights abuses may have per-
suaded themselves and others that such acts, although not desirable,
were required to avoid subversion or an impending civil war. While such
justification is, of course, unacceptable, it may strengthen the perpetra-
tors' resolve to oppose trials and punishment.
(b) Peace may have been achieved after protracted civil war or a
similar armed conflict, with neither side having been defeated and neither
wishing to have its people subjected to prosecutions.
(c) Some opponents of the deposed dictatorial regime may also have
engaged in violence, sometimes against innocent targets, or otherwise
transgressed basic rules of humane behavior. Their liability for past acts
of resistance may be used by partisans of the previous regime to press for
a general amnesty or for impunity for agents of the dictatorship.
(d) Ethnic, religious, or nationalistic divisions may conspire against
the possibility of adopting a policy that would be generally accepted as
fair and impartial.
It is amidst such complex and changing circumstances that political
leaders must obey the call to act responsibly. Since there is no blueprint
to direct their actions, they must rely on good judgment. Responsibility
also requires taking into account the accomplishments and failures of
other countries that have faced similar challenges. This brings us to the
recent experience of the democratic government in Chile.
With the inauguration of President Aylwin in March of 1990, Chile
became the last of the Southern Cone countries ruled by similarly
minded military dictatorships to achieve a restoration of democratic gov-
ernment. This dubious privilege afforded Chilean politicians the possibil-
ity of learning from the example of Chile's neighbors as well as from the
world events of the late 1980s. Though it is too early to determine
whether those lessons were put to the best use, the Chilean government
has certainly tried to be guided by the ethics of responsibility, so far with
promising results.
Unlike Argentina, the transition to democracy in Chile took place
after the new government negotiated rules of the game with a united,
undefeated military that continued to enjoy considerable, albeit minority,
political support. Despite this difference, the Argentinean case was tell-
ing for Chileans. It proved the importance of a systematic effort to reveal
the truth. It also showed the extent to which a government can lose
authority when it raises expectations it cannot fulfill.
Uruguay also provided an example for Chile in that the transition
there was made under conditions similar to those present in Chile. But
in Uruguay the government took too cautious an approach, avoiding not
only trials for past state crimes but also any significant official disclosure
about past violations. Citizens' opposition to this approach led to a na-
tionwide campaign to collect signatures. The campaign succeeded in ful-
filling the constitutional prerequisites for a plebiscite on whether to keep
or repeal the legislation that granted impunity. The majority ultimately
voted to keep it, but the issue was very divisive and distracted the na-
tion's attention during the crucial first period of democratic restoration.
Taking these lessons into account, the Aylwin government decided
to follow a course it could sustain. It adopted the guiding principle that
reparation and prevention must be the overall objectives of the policies
regarding past human rights violations. Righting a wrong and resolving
not to do it again is, at its core, the same philosophy that underpins
Judeo-Christian beliefs about atonement, penance, forgiveness, and
reconciliation.
At a societal level, the equivalent of penance is criminal justice. Yet
the Chilean government's assessment of the situation led it to conclude
that priority ought to be given to disclosure of the truth. This disclosure
was deemed an inescapable imperative. Justice would not be foregone,
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but pursued to the extent possible given the existing political restraints.
Forms of justice other than prosecuting the crimes of the past, such as
vindicating the victims and compensating their families, could be
achieved more fully. The underlying assumption, which I share, was
that if Chile gave truth and justice equal priority, the result might well
have been that neither could be achieved. Fearing that official efforts to
establish the truth would be the first step toward widespread prosecu-
tions, the military would have determinedly opposed such efforts.
Truth was considered an absolute, unrenounceable value for many
reasons. To provide for measures of reparation and prevention, it must
be clearly known what should be repaired and prevented. Further, soci-
ety cannot simply black out a chapter of its history; it cannot deny the
facts of its past, however differently these may be interpreted. Inevitably,
the void would be filled with lies or with conflicting, confusing versions
of the past. A nation's unity depends on a shared identity, which in turn
depends largely on a shared memory. The truth also brings a measure of
healthy social catharsis and helps to prevent the past from reoccurring.
Bringing the facts to light is also, to some extent, a form of punish-
ment, albeit mild, in that it provokes social censure against the perpetra-
tors or the institutions or groups to which they belonged. Although the
truth cannot in itself dispense justice, it does put an end to many a con-
tinued injustice. It does not bring the dead back to life, but it brings
them out from silence. For the families of the "disappeared," the truth
about their fate would mean the end to an anguishing, endless search.
For the truth to achieve these purposes, it must be established as
solemnly and officially as possible and in a manner that is widely recog-
nized as objective and rigorous. It must cover all the relevant facts about
which there is doubt, dispute, or public disbelief. It must also expose all
antecedents and circumstances that are necessary to understand why and
how the past came to happen.
To establish the truth, President Aylwin appointed the National
Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, a panel of eight people from
across the political spectrum. Apart from guaranteeing widespread cred-
ibility, the even number of members sent a signal, which did not escape
political observers, that no precautions were being taken to secure a ma-
jority vote in case of divided opinions, that the exercise was done in good
faith, and that the matter was too important to be treated in a partisan
manner.
The president gave the commission a threefold mandate. First, the
commission was to describe how the repressive system worked, its ante-
cedents and circumstances. Second, it was to account for every individ-
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ual reported dead or "disappeared." The president limited the
commission's mandate to these crimes because although the military gov-
ernment never denied that people had been exiled and imprisoned, it did
deny that there were people who had been killed or had disappeared.
These crimes were the gravest forms of human rights violations. The
commission also accounted for the use of torture-a practice the military
regime denied-describing it as a phenomenon without deciding individ-
ual claims, as it would have been impossible to pass judgment satisfacto-
rily on every case. Further, the commission accounted for crimes
committed by opposition groups. Although many think that these acts
should not be conceptualized strictly as human rights violations, they are
at least similar in nature inasmuch as they violate basic rules of humane
behavior that must be respected not only by those in power but also by
those who seek access to power. The final element of the commission's
mandate was to propose measures for reparation and prevention. To this
end, the commission sought the opinions of a large number of Chilean
social, religious, and political organizations, as well as the expertise of
human rights organizations in Chile and abroad.
Working for nine months with a staff of sixty, the commission ex-
amined more than 4,000 individual complaints nationwide, hearing every
family and countless witnesses. The available documentation was usu-
ally abundant and reliable, notably that of the Vicaria de la Solidaridad,
Chile's most respected human rights organization. Official documenta-
tion was made available to the commission, including autopsy reports
and transcripts of past judicial investigations which, although by and
large inconclusive, nevertheless provided useful pieces of information.
The commission also heard the testimony of retired military, police, and
former secret police personnel. Through Chilean embassies, it received
the affidavits of witnesses living abroad. In each case, the branch of the
armed forces or police that appeared to be implicated by such evidence
was asked to comment. While most of these requests were answered, few
replies contained any substance.
Of all individual cases examined, about 3,000 fell within the com-
mission's mandate. Of these, the commission declared 2,025 to be cases
involving fatal victims of human rights violations committed by agents of
the state; 90 to be cases involving fatal victims of groups engaging in
violent opposition; and 164 to be cases involving fatal victims of political
violence by either side that could not be characterized clearly as human
rights violations. In 614 further cases, the commission could not reach a
firm conclusion due to a lack of sufficient evidence, and it recommended
further steps to advance the investigations in each of these cases.
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In February of 1991, the commission presented a 1,800-page unani-
mous report to the president including its decisions in each of the indi-
vidual cases, several chapters of historical, political and legal references,
and a detailed section containing recommendations for both reparations
and prevention. 4 It proposed pensions for the families of the dead and
"disappeared," measures designed to commemorate the events and honor
the victims, and other forms of relief. It further proposed legal, institu-
tional, and educational reforms aimed at enhancing the promotion and
protection of human rights. In a televised address to the nation, Presi-
dent Aylwin presented the commission's findings and, as the head of
State, atoned for the crimes committed by its agents.
The report of the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation was
published and widely disseminated and discussed in Chile. Congress is
considering a bill to provide reparations for the victims' families and to
put into effect many of the commission's other recommendations.5 Con-
troversy about the report, including rebuttals by General Pinochet and
by the head of the navy, centered mainly on its historical interpretations
and other contextual references. None of the report's findings about in-
dividual victims has been refuted. Across the political spectrum, those
findings were explicitly recognized as the truth.
The report had self-imposed limits. It did not name individual cul-
prits. But it did declare whether the victimizer in a given case had been
an agent of the state or a member of an opposition group. It also identi-
fied the military branch and unit or the political group responsible for the
crime, but referred to the courts of law all specific evidence pointing to
the criminal responsibility of particular individuals. Naming culprits
through an official commission appointed by the executive, which did not
have subpoena powers and could not conduct trials, would have been
analogous to publicly indicting individuals without due process. The
commission declared that the "disappeared" were dead, but because of
its lack of subpoena powers it could provide specific information about
the remains of the "disappeared" in only a minority of cases. The com-
mission proposed that an agency be created to assist the relatives of the
"disappeared" in their search.6
4. Informe de la Comition Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliacion [Report of the National
Commission for Truth and Reconciliation] (La Nacion & Ediciones del Ornitorrinco 1991) (on
file with author).
5. This bill has been approved by Chile's Congress and was published on February 8,
1992 as Law No. 19,123 in Chile's DIANO OFICIAL [OFFICIAL GAZETTE].
6. Law No. 19,123, supra note 5, created this agency.
The overall policy of the Chilean government has other limitations.
Prosecutions have been drastically curtailed by an amnesty law passed by
the military regime in 1978 that effectively decreed impunity for human
rights violations committed from 1973, the time of the coup d'etat, to
1978. This was the worst period, when repression was under the control
of DINA, the regime's feared secret police which systematically prac-
ticed "disappearances." The Supreme Court has upheld the validity of
this illegitimate amnesty. One major crime, however, was exempted
from the amnesty: the assassination of Orlando Letelier, a former Chil-
ean ambassador to the United States, and his colleague Ronni Moffitt, a
United States citizen, in the streets of Washington, D.C. in September
1976, when a bomb placed under Letelier's car was activated. Chile re-
fused to extradite the head of DINA and one of his lieutenants, sought
by the United States to be tried for this crime. Subsequently, the Chilean
military courts conducted a perfunctory investigation, which led no-
where. Recent legal reforms, however, have resulted in the transfer of
the case to the jurisdiction of the civil courts. A few weeks ago, a special
judge appointed to continue the investigation indicted two former secret
police officials and ordered their detention pending trial.
Other than this exceptional case, the government's policy has been
to accept the Supreme Court's ruling on the validity of the 1978 amnesty.
However, the government has pressed for judicial investigations on the
grounds that although they may not lead to convictions, they are neces-
sary to help establish the victims' fate. At the same time, the government
has refrained from proposing any further measures of amnesty for crimes
committed by agents of the state.
Some of the atrocities perpetrated before 1978 and covered by the
amnesty law may be characterized as crimes against humanity, or at least
as analogous to such crimes, and it could be argued that it is the duty of
the Chilean State to prosecute the perpetrators of these crimes. How-
ever, if it is not within its power to do so, the government should at least
refrain from doing anything that would further validate the spurious
1978 amnesty. If in the future it becomes convenient to enact some gen-
eral measure of forgiveness, those acts analogous to crimes against hu-
manity ought to be excluded. Even if the perpetrators of such acts
cannot be prosecuted successfully, it is important not to set the nefarious
precedent that would be established if these crimes were formally amnes-
tied by a democratic government.
The Chilean tribunals are also conducting investigations of crimes
committed after the time period covered by the 1978 amnesty law. How-
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ever, in most cases evidence is difficult to obtain without cooperation by
the armed forces and the police.
Legal restrictions have also prevented the government from releas-
ing all the prisoners who are being tried or have been found guilty of
murder or other politically motivated crimes committed during the mili-
tary regime. These prisoners have not received fair trials and most, if not
all, were subjected to torture during the investigations. They have also
been detained for years. The president pardoned many, but his powers in
this respect are limited. While the Aylwin government does not have the
votes needed to pass legislation without compromises, Congress did ap-
prove legislation that contributed to the release of many others. By now
a large majority of them are out of prison. However, nineteen months
after the restoration of democracy in Chile, about eighty still remain in
prison.
In an imperfect way, Chile has been earnestly searching for the most
feasible course of action to heal the wounds of the past. With the benefit
of hindsight, some things could have been done differently. Perhaps
others may avoid our mistakes. However, this responsible approach has
also produced important salutary results.
In concluding, allow me to offer some very personal recollections
and reflections. I had the privilege of serving as one of the members of
the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation. I traveled through Chile.
I heard hundreds of cases. The contact with so many families of victims
convinced me of the paramount importance and cathartic power of seek-
ing to establish the truth. It was a very personal experience to ask what
happened to the victims' families, and not just what happened to the
victims. The families had refused to allow the previous government au-
thorities to see them cry as they searched for their loved ones. But now
they were being received with respect and offered a seat and a cup of
coffee. The Chilean flag was on the desk as befits an official commission.
They often broke down, because now they could allow themselves that
measure of relief. At first, we did not realize that the very process of
seeking the truth was thus also a patient process of cleansing wounds,
one by one.
The relatives of the victims showed great generosity. Of course,
many of them asked for justice. Hardly anyone, however, showed a de-
sire for vengeance. Most of them stressed that in the end, what really
mattered to them was that the truth be revealed, that the memory of
their loved ones not be denigrated or forgotten, and that such things
never happen again.
For me, as for many of my friends and colleagues in the human
rights movement in Chile, an eighteen-year period is coming to a close.
It began the moment we started to organize the defense of human rights
in Chile after the coup d'etat of September 1973, and has continued
through our present efforts to overcome this dark chapter in our coun-
try's history. During this period the human rights movement has grown
strong. Major changes have occurred in Chile and in the world. We
have learned from them.
Of the many lessons learned, I will refer to one. Back in the hazard-
ous days of late 1973, all of my friends and colleagues in the human
rights movement had to face danger on a daily basis. None of them ever
claimed to have been endowed with innate bravery. They realized that
courage was just another name for learning how to live with your fears.
Eighteen years later, we all have come to realize that under changed cir-
cumstances, a less striking form of courage is called for. It is the courage
to forgo easy righteousness, to learn how to live with real-life restrictions,
but to seek nevertheless to advance one's most cherished values day by
day to the extent possible. Relentlessly. Responsibly.
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